The Philosophy of Disability - Final Presentation by Allison "Ally" Gibbons H01

 Introduction

Many people would think that discussions of disability would be reserved as a medical topic, not a philosophical one. Contrarily, the ethical approaches to how people discuss, legislate, and live with disability has deep roots in philosophy. The book Life is Hard by Kieran Setiya touches on the moral approach to disability in his first chapter. Setiya, interestingly, is a man who lives with life-altering health complications himself, but does not consider himself to have a disability from his perspective. But despite his seemingly hypocritical view of his own “bodily malfunction,” a phrase which will be discussed later, he uses his personal experience and the experiences of caring for his disabled family members to explain how he came to understanding people who live with disabilities. 

The Importance of Understanding Disability

In Life is Hard, Setiya only refers to physical disabilities, likely because cognitive disabilities are a whole other can of worms to get into. However, in my opinion, his logic could still be applied to people with any disability as well. The American Psychological Association found the following:

Percentage of Americans Who Report Having a Disability (of Some Kind)

• 46% age 75+ ​
• 24% age 65-74 ​
• 12% age 35-64​
• 8% younger than 35

This shows that disability only becomes more common as a person gets older, and it is also likely that a person could develop multiple disabilities in a lifetime. Which is exactly why Setiya points out that “disability should matter to anyone who is hoping to get old” (16).

Illness Vs Disease

Setiya summarizes that the distinction between illness versus disease was made more recently in medical history, to remove some of the stigma associated with both short-term or chronic ailments. “Disease” Setiya writes, “is biological” while “illness is . . . a matter of how life feels” (17). Instead of viewing people as ‘diseased,’ in much the same way someone would refer to an animal, they changed the wording to refer to people as simply ‘ill’ or ‘sick.’ This way, the person’s health is viewed as something out of their control and should be treated with more compassion. 

Setiya also puts emphasis on the “phenomenological” aspect of illness (17). No two people who are diagnosed with the same disease will experience illness in the same way. And day-to-day, their level of ‘ill’ feeling can vary drastically. This is where we get ‘invisible’ illnesses, diseases, or disabilities which are not always outwardly obvious.

Defining Disability

Now that Setiya has given us his definition of illness versus disease, he finally clarifies the definition of disability. Setiya writes, disability is “a category of overt bodily malfunction, . . . not akin to illness or disease” (18). He points out that “bodily malfunction is biological” in the same way he defined disease, and disabilities' effects on one’s life are very subject to chance and circumstance, similar to his definition of illness (18). If all of these definitions seem too overlapping, do not fret, Setiya provides the opinions of a prominent philosopher on the theory of disability, Elizabeth Barnes, to clarify.

Elizabeth Barnes 

Elizabeth Barnes refines the previous definition by Setiya by saying that “to be physically disabled is not to have a defective body, but simply to have a minority body” (18). This idea of “minority” is also relatively new. Many disability theorists have worked  “to move disability away from the realm of medicine,” which is very complex and not so easily understood by every person, into the realm of politics, clarifying the disabled as a “political minority.” This move is what eventually led to the passing of the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990, which defends the rights of people part of the disability minority.

And though the people who live with a disability are part of a minority, their disability itself does not automatically make them 'lesser off.' Barnes “suggests that disability is neutral” in respect to well-being, according to her value-neutral model. This is something that Setiya agrees with, saying that “physical disability is not, in itself, an obstacle to living well” but rather just one of many aspects to one’s complex life (18). 

Eudaimonia

Is it just me, or is a philosophy discussion complete without a mention of the ancient Greek philosophers? Setiya brings to the discussion Aristotle’s definition of eudaimonia, saying that Aristotle “thinks the best life is ‘lacking in nothing’” (20). While this sentiment is nice, Setiya thinks that Aristotle’s preoccupation with figuring out the “single ideal life,” may actually “have been wrong” (21). Of all of the people you can list who have lived ‘perfect’ lives, your list’s “members won’t have much in common (21). There is no singular path to life because life is pluralistic. People “can flourish in many ways, doing countless different things” so each person’s eudaimonia is unique to their own experience and perception of the world. Furthermore, this means that we should not try to compare our eudaimonia to any other person’s or to a person with disabilities because it would be useless to try to justify one life as being better or lesser than the other when they have nothing in common.

Skeptics Moral Question of Disability

After Setiya finishes his discourse on the quality of life of people with disabilities, he takes a moment to play the devil’s advocate, or, in this case, the skeptics advocate. On page 24, Setiya points out that "Skeptical philosophers will ask why it's wrong to impose disability on others if [disabilities] don't make life substantially worse" (24). Setiya makes 2 points on this:

• 1.“Adapting to disability is hard” 

Whether it be a gradual adaptation to an advancing disease or a sudden accident or onset that results in debilitation, the process will inevitably come with trauma.

• 2. “It’s not okay to cause harm merely when the net result will not be bad”

While causing harm is bad, skeptics would say that in some situations, like pushing over an old lady so she doesn’t get hit by a car, is causing harm but for a lesser of two outcomes. What Setiya is trying to say is that according to the value-neutral model, yes, having a disability is not a bad thing, but causing a disability would not, in this case, produce a lesser of two outcomes.

The moral of this story is please don’t do what the skeptics are thinking.

Suggested Reading

In addition to Elizabeth Barnes, Setiya brings up many other philosophers' takes on disability and also what it means to live a happy life. I would like to suggest another reading that I think supports the argument that people with disabilities are a diverse crowd, and each is capable of achieving acceptance and happiness. The book Far From The Tree by Andrew Solomon is not necessarily a philosophy book per se, but it surveys “how children and their parents learn to accept one another”. In addition to disabilities like dwarfism, autism, deafness, or down syndrome, he also showcases the experiences of people who are trans, prodogies, or rape victims, to name a few. His wide reaching topics all have the same purpose of showing how people who may have no similarities other than the fact that they are minorities in their own respect, are able to achieve fulfilling lives.

Discussion Questions and Final Thoughts

Disability is a very broad and changing discussion that is effectively useless to try to summarize in one example of one person’s experience. I implore you, reader, to ponder your thoughts on the points Setiya discusses. Do you think that discussions about disability should be a philosophical, political, ethical, or medical matter? How do you think the United States compares in their treatment of people who are disabled? How can we do better in understanding them? I leave the comment section open to you.